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INFORMATION SYSTEMS OUTSOURCING RISKS: A STUDY OF LARGE 
FIRMS
ABSTRACT
Despite  the  considerable  growth  of  Information  Systems  (IS)  outsourcing  in  recent 
years, this trend is still the object of strong criticism. This study has as its aim to show 
the main risks computer outsourcing entails in the case of the largest Spanish firms. In 
order to achieve that aim, we have reviewed the previous literature on this topic and 
later  analysed  the  results  of  a  survey  carried  out  using  a  questionnaire  that  was 
answered  by  357 firms. 
According to the firms under analysis, the main concern in relation to IS outsourcing is 
the  excessive  dependence  on  the  provider  this  type  of  contract  can  generate. 
Nevertheless, some characteristics of firms (mainly their size) determine to some extent 
what  risks  are  seen  as  the  most  relevant.  The  conclusions  also  suggest  that  total 
outsourcing can turn out to be a very dangerous strategy, mainly due to the dependence 
it creates. This is why IS managers should consider other alternatives such as having 
multiple providers or resorting to selective outsourcing.
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INTRODUCTION – THE RISE OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS OUTSOURCING
Information  Systems (IS)  outsourcing  can be  defined  as  the  significant  contribution 
made by external providers of physical and/or human resources, associated either with 
all components or with IT infrastructure specific components in the user’s organisation 
(Loh  and  Venkatraman,  1992:9).  Such  a  contribution  is  confined  to  a  contractual 
agreement that can even entail the assumption of managerial responsibilities linked with 
the provision of Information Technology (IT) services by the supplier (Clark, Zmud and 
McCray, 1995:223).
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The term  outsourcing appeared not long ago, in the 1990s (Tayntor, 2001). However, 
externally  contracted  computer  services  are  nothing  new.  Shared-time  services,  for 
example, were a common practice in firms during the 1960s and 1970s (Grover and 
Teng,  1993:34;  Ketler  and  Walstrom,  1993:449).  Nevertheless,  it  is  the  nature  of 
outsourcing that has changed: while small firms frequently resorted to these services 
seeking to obtain capacities that were internally unavailable or impossible, at present, 
even the largest firms with mature IS departments have outsourced (Grover, Cheon and 
Teng, 1994:36; Teng, Cheon and Grover, 1995:77). What is more, whereas in the past 
outsourcing was relegated to non-information-intensive sectors where the IS could not 
play a central  role  in  terms of  firm competitiveness,  nowadays it  is  possible  to  find 
outsourcing  agreements  in  high-information-content  sectors  (Alpar  and  Saharia, 
1995:203;  Ang and Cummings, 1997:236;  Hurst and Hanessian, 1995:103; McLellan, 
Marcolin and Beamish, 1995:310).
IS outsourcing has experienced a considerable growth in recent years, so much so that 
some authors suggest we find ourselves in the Outsourcing Era (King, 2001:15). Judging 
by the forecast  figures offered by some computer  market  analysts,  this  growth also 
seems to be guaranteed at least in the near future. Thus, according to the forecast made 
by the Yankee Group in October 2002, the global outsourcing market for that year would 
reach a figure between 85 and 95 trillion US dollars, with a foreseen growth rate located 
between 10 and 12% for the four following years (The Yankee Group, 2003). It can also 
be observed that these services are spreading geographically, from North America, the 
United Kingdom and Australia to Western Europe, South America and some countries in 
South East Asia, among them Japan (Moran, 1999:1). Besides, the scope and range of 
services being outsourced are also growing (Currie, 1998:169), as is illustrated by the 
promotion of the following: 
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• BPO  (Business  Process  Outsourcing),  a  relatively  new  concept  that  implies 
combining  IS  outsourcing  with  support  or  consulting  for  the  business  functions 
outsourcing refers to (Currie, 1998:169). 
• ASP (Applications Service Providers) is also developing (Smith, 2002:451) –ASPs are 
third-party  service  firms  which  deploy,  manage  and  remotely  host  software 
applications through centrally located services under a rental or lease agreement– 
(Currie and  Seltsikas, 2001:123; Kearney, 2000:37; Yang and Huang, 2000:227).
• Web and eBusiness Outsourcing, where vendors are contracted to provide web-based 
applications that enable a firm to enter the eBusiness era, is another growing area 
within IS outsourcing (Hirschheim and Dibbern, 2002:7).
• Global Outsourcing, which consists in developing  software in foreign countries with 
highly-trained  computer  staff  and  comparatively  very  low  salaries.  India  is  the 
world’s leader in the field of global outsourcing (Chen and Lin, 1998; Heeks et al., 
2001).
The growth of outsourcing in our nearest environment –Western Europe– has also been 
very  significant  since  the  early  1990s.  A  1998  IDC (International  Data  Corporation) 
survey revealed that outsourcing expenses had passed from 22.666 billion US dollars in 
1996 to 33.616 billion in 2001. Among the factors that may have caused this growth, and 
apart from human capital shortages and the growing competitiveness in European firms, 
we should also mention the process of adaptation to the European Monetary Union firms 
have had to go through (Baldwing, Irani and Love, 2001:16).
We  could  suggest  another  set  of  diverse  reasons  that  account  for  the  growth  of 
computer outsourcing; for instance, the top management’s scepticism about the value of 
Information  Systems  (Lacity  and  Hirschheim,  1993a:17)  and  the  uncertainty  that 
surrounds them, making it difficult to anticipate whether a specific technology will or 
will not prove profitable (Loh and Venkatraman, 1992:17). Pushed by the spectacular 
positive results obtained by some companies that were pioneers of this trend,  many 
4
firms have succumbed to the fashion effect (Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993b:74). Another 
reason is that firms tend to abandon their diversification strategies and have started to 
focus on their critical competences. In this context, firms see IT as a non-basic activity 
(King,  2001:15;  Lacity,  Willcocks  and  Feeny,  1996:13)  and  thus  have  decided  to 
concentrate their  internal  skills  and competences on areas that provide more added 
value (Chen and Lin, 1998:10). IT cost control is another common justification (Ching, 
Holsapple and Whinston, 1996:179; Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:228), as outsourcing 
makes it  possible to reduce the IS department’s size and transform fixed costs  into 
variable ones.  We should equally mention among the reasons for this trend the fast 
evolution of technology that subjects firms to a high risk of technological obsolescence 
which, thanks to outsourcing, is passed on to the firm supplying these services.
We could even argue that the phenomenon of globalisation has had a role in the growth 
of IS outsourcing, mainly in two ways: 
a) The  tendency  of  firms  to  locate  their  productive  processes  in  places  where 
production factors are cheaper becomes evident in what has come to be known as 
Global Outsourcing, which consists in developing  software in foreign countries with 
highly-trained  computer  staff  and  comparatively  very  low  salaries.  (India  is  the 
world’s leader in this area of global outsourcing (Heecks et al., 2001)). 
b) The  growing  acceptance  of  the  Internet  as  a  means  of  communication   has 
undoubtedly exerted an influence on the rise of outsourcing too (Yang and Huang; 
2000:227),  specially  as  far  as  applications  outsourcing  –the  tendency  to  develop 
applications through the Internet instead of installing them in a local environment– is 
concerned (Marchand and Jacobsen, 2001).
 
However, according to Lacity and Willcocks (1995:226-228), the unique, different nature 
of  IT  usually  places  customers  in  a  disadvantageous  position  with  respect  to  IS 
outsourcing providers, due to the following reasons:
1. IT evolves so fast that the degree of uncertainty accompanying every outsourcing 
decision is very high.
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2. IT is involved in every business function, which is why an idiosyncratic knowledge of 
the organisation is required to carry out many IT activities.
3. The costs derived from replacing one IT provider for another are very high, which is 
why fostering competition to discourage providers’ opportunism is complicated.
Customers often lack experience in the signature of outsourcing contracts. This is not 
the  case  for  providers  (Ketler  and  Walstrom;  1993:457).  Due  to  this  information 
asymmetry, providers can favour their own position much better.
For  this  reason,  and despite  the growth of  IS outsourcing and the multiple  reasons 
justifying it, this trend is still the object of strong criticism sometimes. This is why the 
present  paper  seeks  to  identify  the  risks  perceived  to  be  the  most  relevant  in  IS 
outsourcing, from the customer’s point of view. With that aim in mind, we will firstly 
review the literature on IS outsourcing risks, after which we will show the methodology, 
the main results and the conclusions of an empirical piece of work based on a survey 
carried out among the IS managers of the largest Spanish firms. The results will not only 
tell us the level of importance of the said risks in the firms under analysis, but also will 
help  us  to  try  and  determine  whether  or  not  those  risks  are  conditioned  by  the 
outsourcing level or the diverse characteristics of firms (like sector and size) and their 
IS departments.
OUTSOURCING RISKS IN INFORMATION SYSTEMS LITERATURE
IS outsourcing is a managerial decision that entails various risks and problems, so much 
so  that  numerous  authors  have  identified  an  associated  risk  for  each  advantage 
suggested. Firstly, we can encounter problems derived from the dependence this service 
generates. The dependence results from the fact that, in practice, firms find it difficult to 
quantify and define the information services they need, and besides, those services tend 
to evolve over time. Therefore, if these services had not been agreed in the original 
contract, they would have to be charged with an additional rate, thus increasing the 
total costs (Fowler and Jeffs, 1998:121); or internal improvements in the customer firm’s 
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IS might be neglected (Glass, 1996:90).  This is why Lacity and Hirschheim (1993b:76) 
state that external providers are not strategic partners, as the interest in profits is not 
shared. In other words, when the customer’s costs increase, the same happens to the 
provider’s profits. Along the same lines, Guterl (1996:80) suggests that providers would 
rather customers had more additional costs, not fewer.
The loss of critical skills and competences is another relevant problem. When a service 
is  outsourced,  the  customer  loses  his  understanding  of  the  service  over  time.  Even 
though the provider supplies innovative services to the customer, a large part of the new 
knowledge required remains in the hands of the provider and cannot be transferred to 
the customer.  Worse than that,  the firm can lose its  capacity  to be up to date  with 
technological  breakthroughs  (Clark,  Zmud  and  McCray,  1995:231).  Therefore,  the 
customer needs to retain certain know-how and internal capacities in both technical and 
managerial areas if he wants to handle the outsourcing relationship properly (Willcocks 
and Lacity, 1999:177). Retaining these capacities is the best way to identify and evaluate 
potential outsourcing risks and also to perform practices that can mitigate those risks 
(Willcocks, Lacity and Kern, 1999:310).
An additional difficulty has to do with the qualification of the provider’s staff. Although 
in  theory  outsourcing  provides  access  to  technical  knowledge  and  IS  specialists’ 
expertise, what very often happens in practice is that the outsourcing firm is supported 
by the same staff as before (Fowler and Jeffs, 1998:122; Glass, 1996:89), as these staff 
have been transferred from the customer firm to the service-providing firm. Lacity and 
Hirschheim (1993b:78) warn that many of the outsourcing firms feel they have suffered 
losses  in  business  knowledge  and  experience  because  providers  send  their  most 
qualified workers to get new customers from other firms in the sector once they have 
achieved the contract. Besides, providers hardly ever take the initiative when it comes to 
business strategies; they prefer to follow specific instructions instead.
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The  provider’s  lack  of  compliance  with  the  contract is  another  possible  risk.  This 
problem is inherent to any contract: whenever an agent performs tasks for a principal, 
the principal always runs the risk of the agent not completing the task as expected or of 
being less vigilant than the principal would be (Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:230). 
Besides, in the case of IS outsourcing, customers’ needs may not be properly met, and 
an inadequate task priority may be established, above all because the provider does not 
fully understand what the business is all about (Martinsons, 1993:21; Glass, 1996:90).
What is more, an  unclear cost-benefit  relationship might exist within IS outsourcing; 
after all, performing a cost/benefit analysis for outsourcing is no easy matter. Taking into 
account all relevant factors and translating them into monetary values is not easy either. 
For  example,  some  issues  include  determining  how  to  compare  and  translate  the 
potentially better service of an outsourcing vendor with the service provided by the 
internal  IS  department,  and  deciding  how  to  measure  in  economic  terms  the 
consequences  of  an  outsourcing  vendor  failing  to  deliver  products  or  delivering 
unacceptable products (Gupta and Gupta, 1992:49). Before these difficulties, many firms 
admit that their decision to outsource is only based on the costs of outsourcing, and not 
on its benefits (Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:230), seeing as costs exclusively those 
fixed in the contract.
Although one of the main theoretical objectives of outsourcing is to control IS costs or 
flexibilise them by making them become variable, outsourcing may have  hidden costs, 
such as those derived from dismissing or transferring staff, the transfer of licences by 
software vendors, etc. These costs are mainly due to ambiguities in the contract, e.g. 
failing  to  define  present  and  future  IT  requirements;  applying  poor  recruitment 
practices; not allowing providers to obtain reasonable profits and being unable to create 
mechanisms that protect prices in contingency cases (Willcocks, Lacity and Fitzgerald, 
1995:339).  Summing  up,  the  hidden  costs  of  outsourcing  could  be  the  following 
(Barthélemy;  2001:61-66):  a)  vendor  search  and  contracting  -  many  enterprises 
underestimate  the  expense  associated  with  identifying  and  evaluating  suitable  IT 
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vendors,  selecting  a  finalist,  and   negotiating  as  well  as  drafting  the  contract,  b) 
transitioning to the vendor – it can take months before the vendor knows as much as the 
internal IT department, c) costs related to provider management - which imply, amongst 
other things,  verifying that IT vendors fulfil  their  contractual  obligations,  bargaining 
with them, and finally, negotiating any contract changes required, and d) transition costs 
after outsourcing – these costs come from switching vendors or resuming IT activities 
internally.
We should mention possible  security issues,  above all  when a provider has to serve 
several  direct  competitors,  which  means  having  to  keep  confidentiality  about  the 
information corresponding to all of them (Grover, Cheon and Teng, 1994:38; Lacity and 
Hirschheim, 1993a:24). The security of the IS services outsourced will depend on the 
providing firm, which is  why policies and procedures must be negotiated during the 
outsourcing  contract  signature  process  to  ensure  that  IS  security  objectives 
(effectiveness, efficiency, adequacy, integrity, validity, authorisation, privacy) continue to 
be fulfilled (Fink, 1994:5).
Another  risk  is  the  oft-mentioned  irreversibility  of  the  outsourcing  decision (Fink, 
1994:5),  especially if  the user has got rid of  the technical  and human infrastructure 
needed to reconstruct his IS in house (Barthélemy, 2001:67; Fowler and Jeffs, 1998:121). 
There  are  three  main  reasons  for  this  irreversibility:  the  high  costs  involved  in 
reconstructing the IS department, the difficulty to attract the necessary staff, and the 
amount of time required (Clark, Zmud and McCray, 1995:231).
Outsourcing generates various staff-related problems. Therefore, the customer firm will 
face the  possible opposition of the IS staff,  who see outsourcing as a threat to their 
working position. IS staff may find themselves before a dismissal, a retraining period, or 
a  transfer  to  the  service-providing  firm  (Grover,  Cheon  and  Teng,  1994:38).  This 
uncertain  situation  creates  anxiety  and  a  feeling  of  insecurity  that  may  lead  to  a 
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decrease  in  employee  productivity  during  the  period  prior  to  the  signature  of  the 
contract or even after the contract has been signed (Palvia, 1995:270).
When only some staff members are transferred from the customer firm to the provider 
firm, it has been checked that problems related to lack of motivation arise among those 
staying in the customer firm.  These professionals probably feel offended because they 
think they are not good enough to belong to a specialist firm like the computer service 
provider  (Willcocks  and  Fitzgerald,  1996:287).  On  the  other  hand,  those  who  are 
transferred from one firm to another may suffer various changes that can go from keeping 
their seniority or any other favourable condition to the need to adapt to a new corporate 
culture. The status of the IT executives who remain in the customer firm usually improves 
(Martinsons, 1993:21),  but they must reorient their competence (Corbett; 1994:20-21), 
focusing  on  external  relationships  management  and  dedicating  much  less  time  to 
operations management. 
Finally, we can refer to the inability to adapt to new technologies. In theory, access to 
leading-edge technology is a persuasive argument in support of IS outsourcing, as a firm 
can enjoy the latest technology without the lead time that is customarily required for in-
house  development  (Palvia,  1995:269).  Outsourcing  vendors  can  quickly  adapt  to 
machine upgrades and new software releases (Lacity  and Hirschheim, 1993a:20).  In 
practice, though, if providers do not find benefits in the adoption of new technologies, 
they could become reluctant to adopt them, in an attempt to make the service they offer 
as profitable as possible. What is more, if the outsourcing contract does not include a 
clause relative to the future technological evolution, that evolution will not be completed 
(Glass, 1996:90).
All these risks will become greater if customers opt for total outsourcing. Therefore, IS 
managers should consider other alternatives such as resorting to selective outsourcing 
or  outsourcing  with multiple  providers (Currie,  1998:171).  With selective outsourcing, 
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firms can retain the internal knowledge required to handle the outsourcing provider or 
even to revert the outsourcing process. With the option of multiple providers, the customer 
firm  can  negotiate  outsourcing  contracts  with  multiple  providers  differentiated  by 
competence, experience and market position (Cross, 1995:96), thus making the different 
providers’ skills complementary.  However, even these strategies entail some risks. Cross 
(1995:96), for instance, points out that it is difficult to manage and coordinate the work of 
several providers. In turn, Loh and Venkatraman (1992:11) suggest that it is not easy to 
specify each provider’s responsibilities either, especially when the outsourced processes 
are interdependent. Finally, Currie and Willcocks (1998:141) remind us that managing and 
co-ordinating multiple contracts is very time-consuming.  
Other practices that would surely help to reduce risks require a full understanding of 
the nature of the work being outsourced, signing short-term contracts, demanding up-to-
date documentation about those contracts,  and also  have to do with the customer’s 
ability to retain the skills and competences needed to ensure that contracts  add value to 
profits (Earl, 1996:24; Currie, 1998:179, Hurst and Hanessian; 1995:107).
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
After identifying IS outsourcing risks in the literature, we will explore how these risks 
apply  to  the  largest  Spanish  firms.  The  reason  why  we  decided  that  the  target 
population in our outsourcing study should be formed by the largest Spanish firms is 
similar to that provided by Fink and Shoeib (2003: 305) in the research they carried out 
in Australia: since no previous data on IS outsourcing in Spain were available, we could 
not establish population characteristics for our study. Instead, we decided to do a survey 
on large Spanish organisations,  assuming that they would have large IT installations 
and, therefore, would have greater knowledge and experience with IT outsourcing.
In order to determine our target population, we used the directory Las 5.000 mayores 
empresas (The  5,000  largest  firms)  of  Actualidad  Económica magazine,  which  was 
collated  with  other  databases  largely  used  in   business  studies  like  Duns  and 
Bradstreet’s  50.000 Principales Empresas Españolas (the 50,000 main Spanish firms). 
Among the 5,000 firms with the highest sales, we tried to find in the list of the first 
database mentioned above which ones had the same telephone numbers and addresses, 
as this was a symptom revealing that both the IS manager and the structure itself could 
coincide. Once that information was known to us, we decided to send the questionnaire 
only  to  the  firm which,  having  the  same  telephone  number  and  address  as  others, 
showed the highest sales.
In this way, we eliminated 584 firms, after which our final database consisted of 4,416 
firms, to which was sent a questionnaire along with a stamped addressed envelope for 
the questionnaire to be returned. We had to face a problem, namely that field studies 
based  on  surveys  about  IS  outsourcing  do  not  proliferate,  case  studies  being  more 
common (Aubert, Rivard and Patry; 1996; Baldwing, Irani and Love, 2001; Huber, 1993; 
Kern and Willcocks,  2000;  Kern and Willcocks,  2002;  Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993a; 
1993b; Lacity and Willcocks, 1997; Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny, 1996; Loebbecke and 
Jelassi, 1999; McLellan, Marcolin and Beamish, 1995; Palvia, 1995; Willcocks and Choi, 
1995;  Willcocks,  Fitzgerald  and  Lacity,  1996;  Willcocks,  Lacity  and  Kern,  1999). 
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However,  on  the  basis  of  previous  literature  about  this  matter,  we  prepared  a 
questionnaire draft that was later subjected to a pilot test and a pre-test. 5 out of the 19 
questions of the final questionnaire were used in this study, as this paper is part of a 
larger  empirical  study  which  deals  with  a  wide  range  of  aspects  related  to  IS 
outsourcing (see APPENDIX). The questionnaire’s addressee was the IS manager of the 
firms included in the final database. A new inconvenience arose here, because unlike 
what happens in other countries, no listings of these managers are available in Spain, 
which means that the addressee’s identity was unknown. 
The information obtained in the questionnaire was later elaborated using the statistical 
program SPSS for  Windows and treated with univariant and multivariant statistical 
methods. Table I shows the study specifications.
Take in TABLE I
357 valid answers were obtained, which represents an 8% ratio. This ratio is acceptable 
if we bear in mind that obtaining an answer in surveys carried out among executives is 
problematic, particularly in surveys done to IS executives. This is so because the rapid 
technological  change,  the  considerable  investments  firms have  made on  IT,  and  the 
great interest aroused by outsourcing have made these executives become the common 
target of many surveys (Poppo and Zenger, 1998:862). The firms which answered the 
questionnaire correctly are representative of the total population in terms of sales and 
sector1.
RESULTS
We will now present the results of empirical work; firstly, we are going to show some 
general  features  of  the  firms,  such  as  their  outsourcing  level  or  the  size  and 
characteristics of their IS department. Thanks to these data, we will be able to check, in 
the following subsection, what risks are involved in outsourcing, and whether these risks 
1 A T test was used to verify if firms which answered the survey and those which did not answer have different 
sale mean values. The T had a value of –1.699 and the significance level was 0.089. A Chi-square test was used 
to see the relationship between the industrial sector the firm belongs to and the fact that it did or did not 
answer the questionnaire. The Chi value was 3.8 and the significance level was 0.151. This implies that there 
is a non-response bias in relation to these two variables.
13
are influenced by the above-mentioned features. We will finally provide a typology of 
firms, according to which risks are the most important for outsourcing.
 
General characteristics of the firms
Table II shows the outsourcing levels of the target firms along with some of their general 
features. The fictitious variable called “outsourcing” reflects the sum of the outsourcing 
percentages of each IS activity: if this sum equals zero, then there is no outsourcing; on 
the contrary, if the result of this sum is more than zero, then outsourcing exists2. We 
check  that  IS  outsourcing  is  a  widespread  phenomenon,  since  only  14.3%  of  the 
interviewed firms have outsourced no IS services. The fictitious variable “outsourcing 
level” will help us to determine if  firms’ higher or lower outsourcing level conditions the 
risks they take when they decide to outsource their IS services. Thanks to the way in 
which this variable was designed, a fair distribution of firms with outsourcing levels 
above  and  below  average  is  possible,  because  the  median  was  used  as  the  cut-off 
measure.
The size of a firm can be measured by number of employees and sales. Table II shows 
that the interviewed firms are very large with respect to these two variables, since the 
lowest percentages are found in the smallest firms (only 6.2 % of them have between 0 
and 50 employees and 10.1% turn over up to 5 billion pesetas, ca. 30 million €.).
Most of the interviewed firms belong to the Industrial sector (58.8%), followed by the 
Service sector, in which one third of the firms are included. We have detected that 8.1% 
of the answers came from firms belonging to the Financial Institutions and Insurance 
sector.
Despite the size of firms, IS departments do not have a large staff volume. As is shown in 
Table  II,  most  firms have  between 1  and 10 employees,  and  only  very few have IS 
departments with more than 100 employees. The  part of the budget firms allocate to IS 
2 This information is obtained from question 1 in the questionnaire (see APPENDIX). Nevertheless, this paper 
only analyses whether or not a firm outsources some IS activity, without specifying any activity in particular.
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is equally quite low if we compare it with the firm’s total budget.  It can also be seen in 
the same table that most firms dedicate between 0 and 4% of their budgets to IS, and 
only  very few dedicate  more than to  11% to this  department,  the maximum budget 
percentage allocated to IS being 30% (we must point out that the question referring to 
the percentage of the budget dedicated to IS was the least often answered one in the 
whole  survey,  which  means  that  comments  about  this  issue  must  be  treated  with 
caution).   In  short,  both  the  IS  department  staff  and  the  percentage  of  the  budget 
allocated to this function prove that, regardless of firm size, only few human or financial 
resources are assigned to these departments.
Take in TABLE II
Outsourcing risks
Table  III  shows  the  risks  involved  in  IS  outsourcing.  We  must  say  that,  in  the 
corresponding question,  and following the lines of previous works (Collins and Millen, 
1995:9), interviewees were asked to specify the three risks they considered to be the 
most important out of a list that had previously been given to them3. That list was based 
on  the  review of  the  literature  presented  in  a  previous  section  of  this  paper4.  The 
resulting variables were consequently dichotomical, with a zero value when a specific 
risk was not mentioned, and a one value when it was. N appears in the table standing for 
the number of times interviewees placed a particular risk among this ‘top three’. The 
excessive  dependence  on  the  provider  this  contract  may  generate  is  very  clearly 
identified as the main hindrance. Other relevant, although much less often mentioned 
drawbacks  are  the  possible  loss  of  competence  by  the  customer  and  the  dubious 
qualification  level  of  the  provider’s  staff.  Curiously,  the  last  problem   in  order  of 
importance is  the provider’s  inability  to  adapt  to  new technologies.  In  other  words, 
doubts  do  not  refer  to  technical  aspects,  but  to  the  provider’s  personal  (human) 
characteristics.  Another  relatively  surprising  result  has  to  do with  the  fact  that  the 
potential opposition of the IS service staff appears as one of the least valued risks, even 
though the outsourcing contract may put those employee’s jobs in danger.
3 We know this means forcing interviewees to identify three risks, but we must underline that questionnaires 
in which less than three risks or even none were identified were considered valid.
4 The order in which we presented the said risks in the section dedicated to the literature review is identical to 
the ranking shown in Table III, which makes it easier to establish a relationship between the theoretical review 
and the results obtained.
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Take in TABLE III
We then carried out another series of tests which had to make clear whether or not 
these  risks  were  closely  related  to  the  firm’s  characteristics.  In  first  place,  and 
regarding  the  relationship  between outsourcing  level  and  outsourcing  risks,  we  can 
identify three risks as undoubtedly dependent on outsourcing level (see Table IV):
• The firms that outsource the most are also the ones that most fear the dependence 
on the provider that is generated.
• The firms that outsource the most are also the ones that most fear the IS staff’s 
possible opposition.
• They  are  equally  the  most  concerned  about  the  potential  security  problems 
outsourcing may generate.
Take in TABLE IV
As for the influence of size on outsourcing risks, we firstly analysed if the number of 
employees in the firm has a bearing on the development of those risks. In this case, we 
have  detected  quite  a  few  statistical  dependence  relationships.  Firms  with  higher 
numbers of workers show more concern about the qualification of the providing firm’s 
staff,  about the possible opposition to outsourcing of their IS department’s staff,  and 
about the unclear relationship between costs and benefits. In contrast, firms with fewer 
workers  are  above  all  concerned  about   dependence  on  the  provider  and  potential 
security problems (see Table V).
Take in TABLE V
We also found some dependence relationships between the most frequent outsourcing 
risks and firm sales (see Table VI). 
Take in TABLE VI
Firms with the highest sales are the ones which most fear the loss of critical skills and 
competences as well as potential staff opposition. Instead, those with lower sales are 
mostly  concerned  about  the  hidden  costs  of  contracts  and  the  dependence  on  the 
provider.  Therefore, the group of smaller firms (in terms of numbers of workers and 
sales) especially fear dependence on the provider, while greater firms show reluctance 
to outsourcing due to their staff’s opposition.
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Outsourcing risks are the same for the different firms, regardless of the activity sector 
they belong to, as can be seen in Table VII.
Take in TABLE VII
However, Table VIII shows the existence of a relationship between these risks and the IS 
department  staff’s  size.  Thus,  we can say,  for  instance,  that  while  firms with  fewer 
employees in the department are the ones that most fear an excessive dependence on 
the provider, those with a higher number of employees are above all worried about the 
risk  of  losing  critical  skills  and  competences  in  their  IS  department  and  about  the 
development of an unclear cost-benefit relationship.
Take in TABLE VIII
Finally, after studying the relationships between outsourcing risks and the percentage of 
the budget each firm allocates to IS, we have checked that no statistical relationship 
exists. In other words, these risks are not directly related to that budget percentage, as 
can be verified in Table IX.
Take in TABLE IX
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
IS  outsourcing  has  become  a  widespread  phenomenon  worldwide,  and  is  also  very 
common among large Spanish firms. Despite their large size (in terms of both sales and 
number of employees), and judging by the staff volume of IS departments and the part of 
the budget allocated to IS activities, these firms do not dedicate many resources to IS 
services.
The main obstacle mentioned by the largest Spanish firms in relation to IS outsourcing 
is the excessive dependence on the provider this type of contract can generate.  Other 
important fears, although less significant than the previous one, would be the loss of 
competence the customer may suffer  and the dubious qualification of  the provider’s 
staff. Curiously enough, the risk ranked lowest in importance is the inability to adapt to 
new technologies,  which suggests that doubts refer to providers’  personal  or human 
characteristics rather than to their technical skills. Another surprising result is the low 
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ranking for  possible IS staff  opposition,  which clearly contrasts with the importance 
given to this factor in the literature.
Nevertheless,  we  can  find  an  explanation  if  we  relate  these  risks  to  some  of  the 
characteristics of the interviewed firms and their IS departments. Thus, it can be seen 
that the most important problem involved in outsourcing (excessive dependence on the 
provider) is mainly associated with the firms that outsource the most, are smaller (in 
terms of both sales and number of employees) and have fewer IS staff, whereas larger 
firms outsourcing the most are particularly concerned about their own staff ’s opposition 
to this type of contract. In the former case, it seems reasonable for smaller firms to have 
objections to this potential dependence, since they have not so many resources available 
to abandon the provider and look for other alternatives (like the internal reconstruction 
of their own IS department or the search for new providers). In the latter case, it could 
be argued that firms which outsource the most and are larger in size fear the opposition 
of  their  staff  due  to  the  large  number  of  employees  that  might  be  affected  by 
outsourcing.
As for the loss of skills and competences, the risk ranked second in importance, it is the 
most frequent among firms with more resources (in terms of sales and IS staff), which 
would mean that these firms’ most important concern is their own incompetence once 
outsourcing has been introduced. On the other hand, we can say that although there is 
clear  evidence  that  outsourcing risks  are  determined by both outsourcing level  and 
certain characteristics related to firm size (sales, number of employees and IS staff), it is 
also true that other characteristics, such as the activity sector or the budget percentage 
allocated to IS, do not condition those risks.
Finally, we must point out that the outsourcing risks described in this paper should be 
taken into account, both in business practice and in future theoretical developments, 
since all of them have found some support, at least in the firms we have analysed.  In 
order to reduce those risks, IS managers should consider the possibility of not resorting 
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to total outsourcing, choosing instead either selective outsourcing or a multiple-provider 
approach, or even both at the same time. Another interesting alternative would consist 
in the IS department’s facing up to outsourcing providers’ offers with a benchmarking 
study. 
It  becomes  important  in  these  contracts  to  make  sure  that  customer-provider 
relationships are not only based on mutual trust and understanding (although they both 
are essential for any cooperation scheme). The relationship must be additionally based 
on a well-structured contract, and the customer firm must also be permanently vigilant 
about the delivery of the outsourced services. In any case, firms must be aware of the 
need to retain some specific key knowledge in house if they really want the outsourcing 
relationship to work satisfactorily for the customer. 
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APPENDIX: Questionnaire







% Applications analysis % Systems Operation
% Support to end users % Programming
% Staff and/or user training % Security
% Systems implementation % Network service
% Hardware maintenance % E-business solutions
% Software maintenance % Others (indicate)
2. Put a tick on the three main causes for reservations appearing when the time 
arrives to decide whether to outsource or not.
Hidden costs in the contract Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision
Qualification of provider’s staff Loss of critical skills and competences
A great dependence on the provider A possible opposition of our IS staff
The provider does not comply with the 
contract
Security issues




The organization’s profile and the Information Systems Department’s profile
3. The organization’s size (year 2000) and its age.
Staff Sales (billions of pesetas*) Date of 
creation
0-50 Until 5
51-100 Between 6 and 10
101-500 Between 11 and 15
501-1,000 Between 16 and 25
1.001-25,000 Between 26 and 50
More than 25,000 Between 51 and 100
More than 100
* One euro equals 166.386 pesetas
4. Sector
5. Profile of the Information Systems Department/Service (in the year 2000). 
IS department’s staff Workers Department’s date of creation
Department’s name




Table I: Study technical specifications
Scope Spain
Population 4,416  largest  Spanish  business (by sales)
Sample size 357 valid answers (8%)
Sampling error 5%
Survey date June-October, 2001





Below the mean 175 49.0




More than 500 132 36.9
Lost 1 0.3
Sales (billions of pesetas*)
Up to 5 36 10.1
More than 5 and up to 50 227 63.6





Financial and insurance institutions 29 8.1
IS staff
1-10 Employees 240 67.2
11-100 Employees 96 26.9
101-400 Employees 5 1.4
Lost 16 4.5





* 1€ is 166.386 pesetas
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Table III: Outsourcing risks
Risks N % valid Rank
An excessive dependence on the 
provider
Loss of critical skills and competences
Qualification of the provider’s staff
The provider does not comply with the 
contract
Unclear cost-benefit relationship
Hidden costs in the contract
Security issues
Irreversibility of the outsourcing 
decision
The possible opposition of our IS staff








































dependence on the 
provider
No 52.1 47.9 100
Yes 33.3 66.7 100 10.601 0.001
The possible 
opposition of our IS 
staff
No 43.3 56.7 100
Yes 4.5 95.5 100 12.730 0.000
Security issues No 43.2 56.8 100
Yes 30.2 69.8 100 3.536 0.060*
Hidden costs in the contract
Qualification of the provider’s staff
The provider does not comply with the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision

















Table V: Chi-square test: staff and outsourcing risks
Staff







Qualification of the 
provider’s staff 
No 67.3 32.7 100
Yes 52.7 47.3 100 6.398 0.011
An excessive 
dependence on the 
provider 
No 49.6 50.4 100
Yes 60.8 30.2 100 12.613 0.000
The possible 
opposition of our IS 
staff 
No 64.8 35.2 100
Yes 27.3 72.7 100 12.209 0.000
Security issues No 59.3 40.7 100
Yes 73.0 27.0 100 4.022 0.045
Unclear cost-benefit 
relationship
No 67.9 32.1 100
Yes 48.9 51.1 100 9.976 0.002
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Hidden costs in the contract 
The provider does not comply with the contract 
Inability to adapt to new technologies 
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision 












Table VI: Chi-square test: sales and outsourcing risks
Sales




Total (%) Chi-square Sign.
Hidden costs in the 
contract 
No 41.2 58.8 100
Ye
s
64.4 35.6 100 13.747 0.000
An excessive 
dependence on the 
provider 
No 40.2 59.8 100
Ye
s
52.9 47.1 100 4.698 0.030
Loss of critical skills 
and competences 
No 53.1 46.9 100
Ye
s
39.3 60.7 100 5.423 0.020
The possible 
opposition of our IS 
staff 
No 50.0 50.0 100
Ye
s
22.7 77.3 100 6.084 0.014
Qualification of the provider’s staff 
The provider does not comply with the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
















Table VII: Chi-square test: sector and outsourcing risks
Chi-square Sign.
Hidden costs in the contract
Qualification of the provider’s staff 
An excessive dependence on the 
provider
The provider does not comply with 
the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing 
decision
Loss of critical skills and competences























Table VIII: Chi-square test: IS staff and outsourcing risks
IS Staff




Total (%) Chi-square Sign.
An excessive 
dependence on the 
provider 
No 31.0 69.0 100
Yes 48.3 51.7 100 8.609 0.003
Loss of critical skills 
and competences
No 46.0 54.0 100
Yes 34.0 66.0 100 4.027 0.045
Unclear cost-benefit 
relationship
No 45.8 54.2 100
Yes 32.2 67.8 100 4.739 0.029
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Hidden costs in the contract
Qualification of the provider’s staff 
The provider does not comply with the contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing decision

















Table IX: Chi-square test: Budget percentage allocated to IS  and outsourcing reasons
Chi-square Sign.
Hidden costs in the contract
Qualification of the provider’s staff 
An excessive dependence on the 
provider
The provider does not comply with the 
contract
Inability to adapt to new technologies
Irreversibility of the outsourcing 
decision
Loss of critical skills and competences
The possible opposition of our IS staff
Security issues
Unclear cost-benefit relationship
1.591
0.507
0.008
0.685
0.601
0.177
0.130
1.593
1.058
0.407
0.207
0.476
0.927
0.408
0.438
0.674
0.719
0.207
0.304
0.523
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